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Summary  findings
Food safety standards and the tradeoff between these  importing countries (including 4 devel )ping countries)
standards and agricultural export growth are at the  on exports from 31 countries (21 of them developing).
forefront of the trade policy debate. How food safety is  Aflatoxin is a natural substance that ca-i contaminate
addressed in the world trade system is critical for  certain nuts and grains when storage arid drving facilities
developing countries that continue to rely on agricultural  are inadequate.
exports. In a fragmented system of conflicting national  The analysis shows that adopting a  worldwide
food safety standards and no globally accepted standards,  standard for aflatoxin BI (potentially tie most toxic of
export prospects for the least developed countries can be  aflatoxins) based on current international guidelines
severely limited.  would increase nut and cereal trade among the countries
Wilson and Otsuki examine the impact that adopting  studied by $6.1 billion compared with 1998 levels. This
international food safety standards and harmonizing  harmonization of standards would incr ase world
standards would have on global food trade patterns.  exports by $38.8 billion.
They estimate the effect of aflatoxin standards in 15
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The need to understand more precisely how food safety regulations affect trade is
being driven, to a great extent, as a function of challenges in meeting the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (the "SPS Agreement") of the
World Trade Organization (WTO).  The SPS Agreement sets general guidelines under
which trade in agricultural products is conducted to ensure standards are based on sound
science, and does not arbitrarily discriminate or restrict trade.  The WTO rules do allow
members to  set  domestic  standards at  any  level  they  deem appropriate, however,
governments are encouraged to use international  standards-where they exist.  The WTO
disciplines  suggest, therefore,  that harmonization and  equivalence are the preferred
methods of ensuring non-discrimination.  A fragmented system of unilateral action on
food  safety standards is  counter to  both  general WTO principles, and economically
inefficient due to high transaction costs for exporters and global consumers.  Although
there is only limited empirical data in this field, it is assumed that developing countries
are most directly affected by a fragmented system in which firms must meet differing
standards for multiple export markets.
In the food trade, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) plays a central
role in setting internationally acceptable standards.  While governments through Codex
have  made  progress in  crafting harmonized standards in  some areas,  through  the
Commission consensus on  key  international food  safety standards is  lacking  while
national standards proliferate.  Since regulatory requirements and product standards are
substantially different across  countries, typically between developed and  developing
2countries (World Bank, 2001), trade disputes in a non-harmonized  system are inevitable.I
The rising number of notifications to the WTO from developed and developing countries
about national sanitary and phytosanitary standards (a 26 percent increase from 1995 to
1998) reflects this fact.  Understanding the trade impact of these differing standards,
therefore, is of significant importance  and an area of key public policy concern as options
to expand trade in agricultural products are examined.
This paper analyzes how global trade patterns in  selected food products will
change when differing levels of aflatoxin B1 standard are assumed.  Aflatoxins are a
group of toxic substances that can contaminate certain foods.  There is evidence that
aflatoxin B  1 contamination is linked to liver cancer.  The analysis  here extends Otsuki et
al. (2001b) by broadening the country coverage from Africa to a global scope, and by
explicitly examining how imports and exports differ under various regulatory scenarios.
The paper examines trade among 15 importing (4 developing) countries and 31  (21
developing) exporting countries in the world.  All of these countries are WTO members
except  for  Russia, Kazakhstan, and  Vietnam.  These three countries are, however,
observers.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the concepts and debates
over food safety regulations in general in the world food trade. Section III reviews issues
related to aflatoxin regulations and world food trade.  Section IV develops the empirical
methodology to  estimate the  effect of  aflatoxin regulations on bilateral trade  flows.
' One example of the widely different approach  to standards and food safety among trading partners is the
new European Union (EU) maximum  allowable level of aflatoxins in cereals, dried  and preserved fruits and
nut imports. This regulation, set for implementation  in April 2002, has generated concern among exporting
countries, many of them developing countries.  Among the countries expressing  concerns over the new EU
standards were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the
Philippines,  Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and the US (1998, CRC Press LLC).
3Section V then reports the results, and Section VI concludes and discusses the policy
implications.
II. World Food Safety Regulations and Trade
Food safety regulations are mandatory controls over the quality attributes of a
final product, based  on the potential  effects on human health  from  food handling,
preparation, or consumption (Hooker 1999).  The growing prominence of food safety
controls in the public policy debate is based on both scientific and economic grounds
(Henson and Caswell 1999).  The role of science in forming food safety regulations
includes the assessment of risk of food related hazards, the management of risk at a
socially acceptable level, and the release of information about risk to the public.  The
economic basis for food safety regulation emerges out of the concept of a "socially
optimum" level of risk at which the marginal costs of food safety regulations equal their
marginal benefits to the society.
What about trade rules and food safety?  The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary
(SPS) Agreement disciplines play an important role in promoting harmonization of food
safety standards.  The Agreement was entered into force as part of the Uruguay Round
Agreements  in  January,  1995.  The  overall  goal  of  the  Agreement  is  to  ensure
transparency and non-discrimination in how governments can apply food safety, animal,
and plant health regulations.  SPS measures also address issues relating to  market
failures  involved with  imperfect information on  food  safety that  can  arise when
consumers  cannot pay  for  desired levels  of  safety and/or producers fail  to  supply
improved food safety (IATRC 2001).
4Disputes related to SPS measures are often based on questions of  (1) whether a
food  safety  standard is  based  on  sound  scientific principles, (2)  whether  there  is
discrimination between treatment of domestic and foreign producers, and (3) whether the
regulation in place is appropriate to mitigate against risk to public health and least trade
distorting.  The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC)( 2001)
outlines three disputes that have challenged  the use of science as a ground for food safety
measures. The first case is where the U.S. and Canada challenged  the scientific basis for
the European Union(EU) ban on growth hormones in  beef production.  The second
dispute challenged by the U.S. was regarding Japanese testing requirements regarding
treatment effectiveness for new varieties of selected horticultural products.  In the third
case, Canada challenged Australia's ban on salmon imports to prevent the spread of fish
diseases.
Food safety measures may have different implications in terms of the welfare
effects in different countries depending on the differences in risk perceptions, available
market information, the incidence of risk in production, and traditional methods of food
processing and  preparation as noted by  IATRC (2001).  The benefits of food  safety
regulation are  reductions  in  risks  of  morbidity  and  mortality  associated  with  the
consumption of contamninated  food (Antle, 1999).  The costs of food safety regulation
include the cost of production, the compliance cost, the administrative  cost borne by the
taxpayers, and the deadweight loss associated with taxation (Antle).
Petrey and Johnson (1993), Ndayisenga and Kinsey (1994), and Thilmany and
Barrett (1997) illustrate the case where food safety regulations impede trade.  DeRemer
(1997) and Thornsbury et al.(1997) estimated the total impact of technical barriers on
5U.S. exports of agricultural products, and it was $4,907 million in 1996, or 90 percent of
which was due  to  sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  The impact of  food safety
measures was estimated to be around $2,288 million.
According  to  Henson  and  Caswell  (1999),  several  international  standards
organizations, such as Codex, the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), and
the International Office of Epizotics (OIE) have  attempted to  harmonize food safety
regulations.  Codex has designed a food code, particularly to serve as a global food treaty
that can promote and protect SPS standards. The WTO is a proponent  of using this food
code to resolve scientific disputes.  According to Henson and Caswell (1999), there are
two approaches through which national food safety regulations can be justified. First, is
the adoption of international standards that are assumed to comply with the provision of
SPS agreement.  Second, is the assessment of the risks to human health, plants and
animal life, as per food safety regulations.
-II. The Regulation of Aflatoxins
The regulation of aflatoxins in food products has gained considerable attention in
recent  years.  Aflatoxins are a  group of  structurally related toxic  compounds  that
contaminate certain foods and have been associated with  acute liver carcinogens  in
humans.  The different types of poisonous aflatoxins found in food are B1, B2, GI and
G2  (UNDP-FAO, 2000).  Aflatoxin Bl  is the most toxic and common aflatoxin.  It is
generally present  in  corn  and  corn  products,  groundnuts and  groundnut  products,
cottonseed milk, and tree nuts, e.g. Brazil nuts, pecans, pistachio nuts, and walnuts (FAO-
WHO,1997).  In  1997, a  Joint  FAO/WHO Expert  Committee on  Food  Additives
6(JECFA) estimated that reducing the aflatoxin standard from 20 ppb (part per billion) to
10 ppb will decrease 2 cancer deaths a year per billion people.
In 1997, the European Commission (EC) proposed a harmonization of maximum
acceptable level of aflatoxins in certain foodstuffs.  The standard ranged from 4ppb in
cereals,  edible  nuts,  and  dried  fruit, to  lOppb for  nuts  that  are  subject to  further
processing.  Henson et al. (2000) noted that the EC proposal had led to concern among
food exporters about the new and more restrictive standards' effect on trade patterns.
Several  exporting countries  feared  losses in  their  exports  as  a  result of  the  more
restrictive standard.  Countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, India, Argentina, Canada,
Mexico, Uruguay, Australia, and Pakistan requested detailed risk assessments from the
European Union used in designing the new standard. As a consequence of consultations
with their trading partners about these concerns, the European Commission relaxed the
proposed aflatoxin standard in cereals, dried fruits, and nuts.
The revised aflatoxin standard in groundnuts subject to further processing was set
at 15 ppb (8 ppb for Bi)  and 10 ppb (5 ppb for Bi) for other nuts and dried fruits subject
to  further processing.  For cereals, dried fruits, and nuts  intended for direct human
consumption, the standard was much more stringent and was set at 4 ppb (2 ppb for B  1).2
The aflatoxin standards suggested by Codex is significantly more relaxed than the EU
standards.  While Codex does set a standard specifically for B1 group of aflatoxin, it
assumes that 50-70 percent or around 7.5-10.5 ppb of the total aflatoxin level of 15 ppb is
caused by aflatoxin B  1. The overall Codex standard,  therefore, is approximately  9ppb.
2Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (2001  a) provide  a more detailed discussion of aflatoxin standards.
7Otsuki et al. (2001b) find that the implementation of the new aflatoxin standard
by the European Commission will have an adverse effect on African exports of cereals,
dried fruits, and edible nuts to Europe.  The results for 9 African and 15 European
countries show that as the maximum allowable level of aflatoxin B1 is lowered by  1
percent, exports of cereals from Africa to Europe decreases by 1.  1 percent and the drop is
0.43 percent for fruits, nuts and vegetables.  Groundnuts are most significantly  affected by
aflatoxin standards with a  1.3 percent decrease in  exports.  Results suggest that  the
aflatoxin standards proposed by the European Commission are far more stringent  than the
guidelines set by Codex when considering reduced exports.  The total loss of export
revenue for the 9 African countries in the study is estimated to be US $400 under EU
standards, compared to a gain of US $670 million if standards were adopted according to
Codex guidelines.
IV.  An Econometric Model to Examine  Trade and Food Safety Standards
When a measure of stringency  of standards is available, an econometric approach
has an advantage in measuring the statistical relationship between standards and trade
flow, without prior imposition of the sign of the effect.  It is also useful for examining
policy implications once the relationship is estimated. Swann et al. (1996), Blind and
Jungmittag (1999), Moenius (2000), Otsuki et al. (2001a), and Otsuki et al. (2001b),
employed an  econometric model where trade flows were  regressed on  a  proxy  for
standards along with other factors that promote or divert trade. Swann et al. and Blind
and Jungmittag regressed import and export on the stock of standards. Using a gravity
model, Moenius regressed bilateral trade flow on the stock of standards along with Gross
8National Product (GNP) and population, and geographical distance between variables
countries.
A  gravity model is  used to  explain bilateral trade flows using key economic
variables that represent the size of a country's economy, such as Gross National Product
(GNP) and  population, and geographical distance between variable countries. WAhen
combined with data on food safety standards in importing countries, bilateral trade flow
data allows analysis of how differing standards promote or limit trade between pairs of
importing and exporting countries.
Our specification  of gravity model is as follows:
In V, = bo  + b 1 In GNPPCj + b 2ln GNPPCj +  b 3ln DIST,, + b 4 In STj
+ b5 Dcol  + b6 DEII  + b7 DASEAN  + b 8 DNAA  + b9D,ERCOSUR  +  6u
VY,  denotes the value of trade from country  j  to country i.  It is obtained from the trade
data of the United Nations Statistical Office.  Products that are included in this analysis
include wheat (SITC041), rice (SITC042), maize (SITC044), dried and preserved fruits
(SITC052), and nuts (SITC05171 and 05172).  We use data for the time period between
1995 and 1998. Parameter b's are coefficients, and c  k  is the error term that is assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero.  GNPPCi and GNPPJQ are real per-capita
GNP of importing country i and exporting country  j  in 1995 U.S. dollars, respectively.
DIST is the geographical  distance between country i andj.
STi is the maximum level of Aflatoxin BI imposed on imports by the importing
country, i. It  is expressed as Aflatoxin B1 contamination in parts per billion, and is
obtained from FAO survey of mycotoxin standards on food and feedstuffs in 1995 (FAO,
91995).  Table I depicts the Aflatoxin B1 standards for the importing countries in our
sample.  A greater value of this variable implies a more lax regulation of Aflatoxin B1
contamination, and vice versa.  If this standard is applied at the border, products with
Aflatoxin B  1 contamination  equal to or below ST would successfully enter the importing
country.
Products with Aflatoxin Bl  contamination  above ST are retained in the exporting
country, or rejected at the importing country's border.  In this respect, a country that
exports food  products to  more than one country faces different aflatoxin standards.
Positive  trade  flows in  COMTRADE  data recorded from  country to  country with
different standards imply that countries export food products with differing levels of
aflatoxin contamination.  Under the fragmented system of standard setting, aflatoxin
standards for food safety tend to be heterogeneous  within a given exporting country (e.g.
there are production and distribution channels that satisfy different aflatoxin standards).
The standards of exporting countries, therefore, do not necessarily measure minimum
level of aflatoxin  contamination  in their exports.
The coefficient for this variable in our gravity model generally implies changes in
exports associated with an incremental change (relaxation or tightening) in ST.  If this
standard does limit trade, then this coefficient is expected to be positive.
A dummy variable for colonial ties is included in order to control the omitted
variable effect of colonial ties on trade flow as used in Otsuki et al. (2001a, 2001b).  It
takes the value of one if a  colonial tie exists between a given set of importing and
exporting countries, and zero, otherwise. Dummy variables for the free trade area (FTA)
are included for a similar reason, as preferential treatment of exporting countries in a
10FTA member is likely to have a trade-promoting effect (Soloaga and Winters, 1999).
The terms  DEU,  DASSA4,  DNAFTA and  DM,ERCoSUR  denote the dummies for  European
Union, ASEAN, NAFTA and MERCOSUR,  respectively.  Dummy variables for the year
also are included in the model, in order to control for systematic  differences across time.
V. Results
Separate regressions are run for three product groups, cereals, nut products and
dried and preserved fruits using an fixed-effects model. Following  the models developed
by Otsuki et al. (2001a, 2001b), a panel is formed, with respect to exporting countries
whose  unobserved  characteristics that  are  country-specific, may  cause  systematic
variation.
Results are reported in Table 2.3  The results generally supports the conclusion
that the gravity model is well suited to examine all product groups in the analysis.  The
coefficients for distance are negative and are significant for all of the product groups.
The coefficients for per-capita  GNP in importing countries are positive and significant for
all of the product groups. The results for per-capita GNP are not predictable in prior due
to two counteractive effects, domestic absorption and the scale effect on production.
We find that aflatoxin B 1 standards in importing countries have a negative effect
on  trade  flows  in  the  cereals and  nuts  regression.  The impact of  the  standard is
insignificant in  the  dried and preserved fruits  regression.  The first  two  results  are
consistent with the findings in Otsuki et al. (2001b).  When global trade is examined in
3The  results were examined for robustness of variances using WLS. The fixed-effects  model result is
found to be robust against heteroscedasticity  of the standard error.
11cereals and nuts, we find that a more stringent standard tends to limit trade.  The results
for dried and preserved fruits indicates, however, that the negative effect of the aflatoxin
standard cannot be generalized globally.
The EU  dummy is found to be positive and significant for all of the product
groups.  The Mercosur dummy is found to  be positive and significant for cereals and
dried and preserved fruits, but is insignificant for cereals. The results for the other FTA
dummies do not show a strong support for the trade-promoting  effect of a FTA.
Simulation Exercises Under Various  Scenarios
In this section, we predict how trade patterns change, as aflatoxin B1 standards
are  harmonized  at  varying  levels.  We  make  the  following assumptions  prior  to
conducting the  simulation analysis.  The  first  relates to  the effect  of  an  exporting
country's standard on its exports.  We do not have data on exporting country standards in
all of the cases.  Importing and exporting countries are treated independently, therefore,
such that an assumed level of aflatoxin B 1 standard of a country as an importer does not
imply the level  of maximum aflatoxin B1  contamination of its exports of the  same
product.
The fixed-effects model coefficient estimates on the standard variable are used to
predict changes in trade flows associated with different levels of aflatoxin B I standards. 4
Figure 1 presents the simulated relationship between aflatoxin standards and total trade
flows between the 31 exporting countries and 15 importing countries.
4 See Otsuki et al (200 la) for a detailed  description of the methodology.
12One  important observation is  the  total  trade  flow  under  different  levels  of
harrnonization. Table 3 highlights the gains and losses for the trade flow of cereals and
nuts at, (1) the Codex Standard, (2) EU harmonizing at 2 ppb and (3), the harmonized
level of 2 ppb for all nations compared to the break even point where the sums of losses
and gains from a harmonized standard are equal. This break-even point provides a zero-
sum condition on the changes in the value of exports across the exporting countries. The
Codex standard at 9 ppb being more lax than the standard at break even point (5.1 ppb for
cereals and 4.1 ppb for nuts), increases the total trade flow of cereals and nuts by $6140
million. On the other hand, the stringency of EU standard at 2 ppb reduces the trade flow
by $6050 million.  The loss in trade flow is significantly less ($995 million) when only
EU harmonizes at 2ppb while the rest of the countries maintain their status quo level i.e.
standards remain unchanged from the 1998 level.
The other interesting issue would be to do a country level analysis that compares
trade flow for all the exporters under a different level of standard.  This paper presents
five different scenarios to highlight this issue.
Scenario One: The first scenario compares (1) the value of exports when Europe
adopts it new standard of 2 ppb in 2002 with all other countries' standards unchanged
from their 1998 levels, and (2) all importing countries standards remain unchanged from
their  1998 levels.  This  comparison shows  how  trade  will  change  after  Europe
implements its new standard in 2002 for 31 exporting countries.
The results are reported in Table 4.  They suggest that the value of exports under
case (1) is US $ 995 million (8.3 percent) less compared to the case (2).  Hungary, Israel
and Brazil are found to be  gainers from the EU harmonized standard.  Their largest
13trading partner of cereals and nuts is Austria, which had a  I ppb standard prior to the
harmonization. The other importing countries in the exercise are all expected to decrease
exports .
Scenario Two: In this case, the comparison is between (1) all importing countries
adopting a standard of 2ppb and (2) Europe implements its 2ppb standard and all other
countries stay at 1998 levels of regulatory stringency.  As shown in Table 5 the value of
exports under case (1) is US$ 5.1 billion (46 percent) lower when compared to case (2).
This implies that trade becomes much more restricted when all importers adopt the EU
harmonized standard.
While there is not  an obvious pattern of distribution of gainers and losers  in
scenario 1, scenario 2 shows a clear contrast in the difference between developed and
developing countries.  The global harmonization at 2 ppb generates more loss for non-
OECD countries than OECD countries. This is because the change in standards in non-
OECD importing countries is more drastic than that in OECD countries given standards
are less stringent in non-OECD today.  Non-OECD countries that export primarily to
other non-OECD countries tend to lose from a world wide harmonization of standards at
2ppb.
Scenario Three: The third scenario compares (1) a harmonization under a break-
even condition where the sums of loss and gains from a harmonized standard are equal
and (2) all importing countries standards remain unchanged from their 1998 levels. As
Table 6 indicates, the  majority of non-OECD exporting countries are losers whereas
OECD countries are primarily gainers in this scenario. The OECD member countries are
estimated to gain by US$ 536 million or 7.7 percent of the total exports from the OECD
14member countries in the sample.  In contrast, the non-OECD countries are estimated to
lose by US$ 502 million or 10 percent of the total exports from the non OECD countries
in the sample.
Scenario Four: In this case, we examine trade flow when (1) all countries adopt
an international standard of 9ppb in contrast to (2) all importing countries remaining at
1998 standards.  Harmonization at the Codex level is estimated to increase the value of
cereal and nut exports by US$ 6.1 billion or 51 percent of the status-quo level of 1998.
The results reported in Table 7 indicates that the value of exports under the case
(1) generates US$ 6 billion more than the case (2).  In this scenario the EU countries e.g.
France, Denmark and the Netherlands gain as a result of Codex standard. This is because
these countries trade with other EU countries such as Germany and U.K which have
relatively stringent standard currently.  When the standards are relaxed to the Codex
standard at 9 ppb, these countries experience an increase in trade flows.  In contrast,
developing countries such as Pakistan, Vietnam and Thailand exhibit a trade loss as a
consequence of adopting the Codex standard.
Scenario Five: In this exercise we compare the case where (1) all the importing
countries adopting a standard of 2ppb and (2) harmonization of standards by all countries
at 9ppb.  The results in Table 7 suggest that harmonization at the-2-ppb level across all
the importing countries will result in US$ 12.2 billion or 67 percent decrease in cereal
and nut exports. Some of the losing exporters under case (1) i.e. at 2ppb are Thailand,
Uruguay and Paraguay.. As we expect when the standards reach the stringency level of 2
ppb from the Codex standard, all the countries experience a loss in trade flows. Results
are depicted in table 8.
15Combined with the result in Table 5, the case (2) will result in $US 7.1 billion (64
percent) more exports than the case where only EU harmonizes standard at 2 ppb leaving
other importing countries unchanged their standards.
In sum, the country-level analysis indicates that the value of exports from EU
countries are relatively unaffected by the EU harmonized standard whereas developing
countries are mostly losers from the harmonization.
In the final simulation, changes in value of trade flow are computed for each
importing and exporting country.  The trading partner within the sample countries which
account for the largest gain and loss of trade flow is then identified. Table 9 and 10
contain all the results.
Table  9  presents  the  result  for  importing  countries.  The  highest  gain  is
experienced by U.K. with an estimated increase of 718.7 thousand, accounting for 45
percent of the total positive change in trade flow.  Countries that increase imports from
the  harmonization at the  break-even point level are UK,  Germany, Austria, Brazil,
France, Australia, Spain, Italy and Israel. However, among them three EU countries UK,
Germany and Austria constitute for more than 90 percent of the gains. This reinstates the
fact that EU countries have had the most stringent standard in the world and thus they are
better off when standards are relaxed to 5.1 for cereals and 4.7 forniiuts  at the break even
point.  France is the major exporting partner to most of the EU importing countries. The
harmonization thus will tend to  increase intra-regional trade in  EU or  industrialized
countries in general. India suffers the biggest loss in imports, with Thailand as its trading
partner whose trade flow will decrease the most.  This result confirms that India has the
most lax standards (30 ppb) of all the importing countries in the sample.
16Table 10 shows the result of the same exercise for the exporting countries.  The
result indicates that France increases exports accounting for 71.6 percent of the total
positive gain.  The six EU countries (France, Italy, Netherlands, Germany, Spain and
Hungary) account for more than 95 percent of gains in exports.  Their trading partners
gaining from the harmonization are also EU countries, Germany, UK and Austria. This
also confirms that the harmonization at the break-even point will greatly increase intra-
EU trade. It should be noted that the trading partners(i.e.  the importers) of the gainers are
the  countries  with  very  stringent  aflatoxin  standard.  Hence  it  is  obvious  that
harmonization at the break even point benefits the six EU countries, the gains coming
from countries moving to relatively lax standard from very stringent standard.  On the
other  hand,  most  developing countries  lose  exports  as  a  result  of  harmonization.
Countries like Canada, Mexico, Australia and Pakistan who feared losses due to the
stringent standards set  by EU (2 ppb), suffer a loss in exports even from harmonization
at the break-even point.  With stringent standard level  at EU harmonization, some
countries in table 10 (e.g. Israel, Egypt) with very small gains are likely to lose . It is
interesting to note that developing countries like India and Nigeria gain as exporters as a
result of harmonization even though as importers they lose.  This is due to the separation
assumption on the base model for simulation.  The change in the value of exports and
imports of these countries are computed as though they were different countries. Hence,
it is possible that India and Nigeria have the EU countries as their trading partners and
hence,  gain  as  exporters as  a  result  of  relaxation of  standard in  the EU  due  to
harmonization.  USA and Canada will also decrease their exports due to the contraction
of mutual trade since their standards are more lax than the break-even level.
17Simulation results in table 10 shows that U.S. and Canada lose in exports as a
consequence of harmonization at the break-even point. Authors' calculation based on the
UN COMTRADE data records report that U.S. and Canada experienced a 5.6% decline
in  exports in the global market between 1995-1998 .5 Hence, it is reasonable to assume
that harnonization of aflatoxin standard in general (may  be different from the break even
point level) will adversely affect U.S. and Canada as exporters. However, the effect of
harmonization on European Union countries is imprecise. These countries experience a
positive  change in  exports at the break-even point whereas UN  COMTRADE data
records show that there is a downward trend of 3.2% in exports for these countries
between 1995-1998. Hence, the net effect of harmonization is hard to predict.  On the
other hand, the Asian, African and Latin American countries  are found to have a positive
trend in exports for the period 1995-1998. This positive growth is as high as 27% for the
Asian countries. Consider Vietnam, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Pakistan as representative of
the Asian sector. These countries who are actually suffering a loss in exports at the break
even point might turn out to be gainers due to harmonization if this loss is offset by the
positive trend in  exports.  The African and  Latin American countries in  our sample
exhibit both positive and negative change in trade flow at the break even point.  Hence,
the net effect of harmonized  aflatoxin standards on these countries is unclear at this point.
VI. Conclusions
This study examines the impact of adopting international food safety standards
and  harmonization of  standards on  global food  trade patterns.  The paper develops
5 Factors other than aflatoxin standard also affect this change in exports
18econometric models and a simulation method to estimate the effect of aflatoxin standards
in 15 importing (4 developing) countries on exports from 31 (21 developing) countries.
The analysis extends Otsuki et al. (2001b) by broadening the country coverage
from Africa to a global scope and by explicitly examining how imports and exports differ
under various regulatory scenarios.  Our analysis uses the first stage estimates of the
elasticity of  bilateral trade  flows in  certain foods with  respect to the Aflatoxin  B1
standard.
The findings support those in Otsuki et al. (2001b) which show that the value of
trade in cereals and nuts is negatively affected by aflatoxin B1 standard and that this
negative relationship  is not apparent in the case of dried and preserved fruits trade.
The results in this analysis are combined to predict how the direction of trade is
altered by food safety regulations under alternative scenarios.  We find that adopting an
international standard for aflatoxin BI based on current Codex guidelines will increase
cereal and nut trade among countries in the exercise by $US 6.1 billion, or 51 percent
from the 1998 levels.  It is $US 12.2 billion or 67 percent more than the value of exports
under the case where all 15 importing countries harmonize their standards at the 2 ppb
level.  Moreover, we  estimate that world exports would rise  by $38.8 billion  if  an
international standard (Codex) were adopted, compared to the currieit divergent national
standards in place.  Exports are estimated to decrease by $3.1 billion if the world adopted
the EU standard (i.e. 2 ppb) compared to current national standards.
Harmonization of this food safety standard at a level more stringent than  one
suggested by intemational standards indicates that food safety standards can severely
limit developing country exports.  This analysis reveals, moreover, the trade impact of a
19fragmented food  safety  system  in  which national regulations differ  across trading
partners.  An initiative to encourage international standards, along with mechanisms to
directly assist developing countries in raising standards to international levels merits
serious consideration.  In this specific case of aflatoxin standards, one might consider
programs to provide vaccination against hepatitis B to lower risk of liver cancer (along
with other serious health risks), encouraging  the development  of an international  standard
to  be  adopted worldwide,  and  aid to  the least  developed producers of  agricultural
commodities  most affected by aflatoxin contaminations. 6
6 For details on conclusions by JECFA regarding aflatoxin  standards and risk see; John L. Herrman, World
Health Organization, World Trade Organization,  Presentation at the Risk Assessment  Workshop, June 19-
20, 2000, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps  e/riskOO_e/riskOO  e.htm#programme.
20References
Antle, John M. (1999). Benefits and Costs of Food Safety  Regulation. Food Policy 24.
605-623.
Blind, K. and A. Jungmittag (1999). The impacts of innovations and  standards and
German trade in general and on trade with the UK in particular. Internal Paper of
Fraunhofer 2: 205-221.
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,  World Trade Organization (1998).
Submission  by the Gambia. G/SPS/GEN/50, February 10, 1998. World Trade
Organization,  Geneva.
European Commission  (1997). Commission Regulation  (EC) No. 194/97 of 31 of January
1997, The European Commission.
European Commission  (1998). Commission Regulation  (EC) No. 1525/98 of 16 July
1998,  European The Commission.
FAO/WHO (Food and Agriculture Organisation and World Health Organisation) (1997).
Acceptable Daily Intakes, Other Txicological  Information, and Information on
Specifications. Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee  on Food Additives, Rome, 17-
26 June 1997.
Finger, Michael. J. and Phillip Schuler. (2000). Implementation  of Uruguay Round
Commitments:  the Development Challenge.  World Economy v23, n4: 511-25.
Food and Agriculture Organization (1995). Worldwide  Regulations for Micotoxins
1995:  A Compendium. FAO, Rome.
Hooker, Neal H. (1999). Food Safety Regulation and Trade in Food Products. Food
Policy 24, 653-668.
Hooker, Neal H. and Caswell, Julie A. (1995). Regulatory  Targets and Regimes for Food
Safety: A Comparison of North American and European Approaches. Food
Marketing Policy Center, Department of Agricultural  and Regource  Economics,
University  of Connecticut.
Henson, Spencer and Caswell, Julie A. (1999). Food Safety Regulation: An Overview of
Contemporary Issues. Food Policy 24, 589-603.
Moenius, J. (2000). Three Essays on Trade Barriers and Trade Volumes. Ph.D.
Dissertation.  University of California, San Diego
Maskus, Keith. E. and John S. Wilson (2001). Technical Barriers to Trade:  A Review of
Past Attempts and the New Policy Context. In Maskus, K.E. and Wilson,  J.S.
21(Eds.) Quantifying  Trade Effect of Technical Barriers: Can it be done?
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI.
Maskus, Keith. E. and John S. Wilson, and Tsunehiro Otsuki (2001). An Empirical
Framework  for Analyzing Technical Regulations  and Trade. In Maskus, K.E. and
Wilson, J.S. (Eds.) Quantifying Trade Effect of Technical Barriers: Can it be
done? University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor,  MI.
Ndayisenga, F., Kinsey, J., (1994). The Structure of Non-Tariff Trade Measures on
Agricultural  Products in High Income Countries.  Agribusiness 10 (4), 275-292.
Orden, David and Donna Roberts (Eds.), 1997. Understanding  Technical Barriers to
Agriculture  Trade, Proceedings of a Conference of the International Agricultural
Trade Research Consortium, University  of Minnesota, Departrnent of Applied
Economics, St. Paul, MN.
Otsuki, Tsunehiro,  John S. Wilson, and Mirvat Sewadeh  (200  la).  What Price
Precaution? European Harmonisation of Aflatoxin  Regulations and African
Groundnuts  Exports. European Review  of Agricultural  Economics.
Otsuki, Tsunehiro,  John S. Wilson, and Mirvat Sewadeh (2001b). Saving Two in a
Billion: Quantifying  the Trade Effect of European Food Safety Standards on
African exports. Food Policy.
Petrey, L.A. and Johnson, R.W.M. (1993). Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: Sanitary
and Phytosanitary  Measures. Review of Marketing  and Agricultural  Economics
61,433-442.
Roberts, D. and DeRemer, K. (1997). Technical Barriers to US Agricultural  Exports.
Economic Research Service, USDA, Washington,  DC.
Soloaga, I. and L. A. Winters (1999). How Has Regionalism in the 1990s Affected  Trade.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #2156. The World Bank.
Washington,  D.C.
Swann, P., P. Temple, and M. Shurmer (1996). Standards and trade performance: The
UK experience. Economic Joumal 106: 1297-1313.
The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (2001). The Role of Product
Attributes in The Agricultural Negotiations, Commissioned  Paper # 17, May 2001.
Thilmany, D.D., Barrett, C.B. (1997). Regulatory Barriers in an Integrating World Food
Market. Review of Agricultural Economics 19 (1), 91-107.
Thornsbury, S., Roberts, D., DeRemer, K., and Orden, D. (1997). A First Step in
Understanding  Technical Barriers to Agricultural  Trade. Paper presented at the
22Conference of the International  Association of Agricultural  Economists,
Sacramento, August 1997.
UNDP/FAO (1998). Regional Network Inter-Country Cooperation  on Preharvest
Technology and Quality Control of Food grains (REGNET)  and the ASEAN
Grain Postharvest Programme,Bangkok,  Thailand.
http://www.fao.org/inpholvlibrary/xO036e/xO036e00.htm.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration  (2000). Foodborne  Pathogenic Microorganisms and
Natural Toxins Handbook.  http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-mow/chap4l.html
Wilson, John S. (2000). The Development  Challenge in Trade: Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards.  Paper submitted to WTO Meeting on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards June 19, World Trade Organization,  Geneva.
World Bank (2000). Global Economic  Prospects 2001, Washington,  DC







D  8- 
6-
4  - . . .Nt 
I  on  fo  *-  /  1inI  Afaon  I  +,A(pb
B  erenak-  Br1  eveak  01  20  25  30
L_  nuts fiorAflatoxinBl  standardpb
24Table 1. Aflatoxin B1 Standards  followed by the Importing Countries
Importer  Standards  for  cereals  and  Standards  for  nuts (ppb)
dried  fruits  (ppb)
Australia  2.5  7.5
Austria  I  I
Brazil  5  5
Canada  7.5  7.5
France  5  1
Germany  2  2
India  30  30
Israel  5  5
Italy  5  5
Japan  10  10
Malaysia  17.5  17.5
Nigeria  20  20
Spain  5  5
UK  2  2
USA  10  10
Source:  FAO  (1995)
25Table 2. Fixed-Effects Model Regression Results (Dependent Variable = Value of
Trade Flow)
Cereals  Nuts  Dried/preserved
Fruits
Log of importer's  0.25***  0.27***  0.77***
GNP per capita  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.  1)
Log of exporter's GNP  0.99**  0.55  2.90***
per capita  (0.48)  (0.5)  (0.48)
Log of distance  -1.66***  -1.08***  -I 10***
(0.15)  (0.14)  (0.12)
Log of standard  1.12***  0.34***  0.09
(0.13)  (0.11)  (0.11)
Colonial tie dummy  2.44***  1.84***  1.8***
(0.92)  (0.61)  (0.51)
Dummy for European  2.75***  2.12***  1.04***
Union Member  (0.4)  (0.38)  (0.33)
Dummy for Mercosur  3.76***  -0.96  3.9***
Member  (0.85)  (1.09)  (0.97)
Dummy for Asean  -1.93  -0.35  2.23**
Member  (1.34)  (1.17)  (1.06)
Dummy for NAFTA  -2.60***  0.70  1.03*
Member  (0.78)  (0.7)  (0.61)
Time dummy  for year  0.01  0.02  0.25
96  (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.19)
Time dummy for year  0.09  0.20  -0.25
97  (0.23)  (0.2)  (0.19)
Time dummy for year  0.19  0.03  -0.38*
98  (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.19)
Adjusted R-squared  0.555  0.517  0.546
Number of  970  912  844
observations  _ .
1.  *, **  and *** imply significance  at the 10 percent,  5 percent and  1 percent  levels under  a two-tailed
test respectively.
2.  Inside parentheses are standard errors.
26Table 3. Predicted Value of Trade Flow under Alternative  Regulatory Scenarios
(US$ million)
Cereals  Nuts  Total
Flow  Change  /A %  Flow  Change  IC %  Flow  Change  F/E %
(B)  L  (D)  (F)
Benchmark  (A) 9117  0  0.0  (C) 284  0.0  (E) 1195  0  0.
(No change)  _  I
Break-even  9117  0.  2840  0.  11957  0  0.
Point
Codex 9 ppb  14783  +5666  +62.1  3313  +473  +16.7  18096  +614  +51.3
EU harmoniz-  8108  -100  -11.1  2854  +1  +0.5  10962  -995  -8.3
ation 2 ppb  _  _  __  _  _
All 2 ppb  3382  -5735  -62.9  2524  -31  11.1  5906  -605(  -50.
27Table 4: Scenario 1
Exporter  EU 2ppb with the rest of  Status Quo  Change from  % difference
the importers status-quo  Status Quo  with status quo
(US $1,000)  (US$1,000)  (US $1,000)
Hungary  51825  46737  5088  10.89
Israel  7260  7176  84  1.17
Brazil  26270  26228  42  0.16
Paraguay  37269  37366  -97  -0.26
Uruguay  46849  47068  -219  -0.47
Sri Lanka  20067  20162  -95  -0.47
Argentina  3840299  3858778  -18479  -0.48
Tanzania  5837  5871  -34  -0.58
Vietnam  35028  35420  -392  -1.11
Pakistan  94809  96083  -1274  -1.33
India  184913  188000  -3087  -1.64
Egypt  2593  2645  -52  -1.97
Australia  138015  142713  -4698  -3.29
Thailand  623751  646472  -22721  -3.51
South Africa  22410  23250  -840  -3.61
Mexico  4635  4888  -253  -5.18
USA  3673428  3901735  -228307  -5.85
Zimbabwe  2598  2805  -207  -7.38
Nigeria  1531  1724  -193  -11.19
Canada  362278  415762  -53484  -12.86
Kazakhstan  13464  15722  -2258  -14.36
Russia  2449  2958  -509  -17.21
France  1020665  1261822  -241157  -19.11
Romania  6642  8216  -1574  -19.16
Spain  99084  128920  -29836  -23.14
Netherlands  121900  165978  -44078  -26.56
Italy  290317  439438  -149121  -33.93
Senegal  4739  7258  -2519  -34.71
Denmark  13133  21342  -8209  -38.46
Germany  192118  363257  -171139  -47.11
Austria  15869  30843  -14974  -48.55
Total  21924092  23913276  -1989184  -8.32
28Table  5: Scenario  2
Exporter  All  importers  2ppb  EU  2ppb  with  Change  from  EU  % difference
the rest of the  2 ppb  with  the rest  with EU  2 ppb
importers  of the importers  and  the rest of
status-quo  status  quo  the importers
status-quo
(US $1,000)  (US$1,000)  (US $1,000)
Netherlands  121376  121900  -524  -0.43
France  1012015  1020665  -8650  -0.85
Germany  190229  192118  -1889  -0.98
Spain  97327  99084  -1757  -177
Denmark  12853  13133  -280  -2.13
Austria  15522  15869  -347  -2.19
Italy  282161  290317  -8156  -2.81
Israel  6897  7260  -363  -5.00
Hungary  46576  51825  -5249  -10.13
Brazil  23535  26270  -2735  -10.41
Tanzania  4971  5837  -866  -14.84
India  142176  184913  -42737  -23.11
Nigeria  1114  1531  -417  -27.24
Egypt  1841  2593  -752  -29.00
Romania  4543  6642  -2099  -31.60
Mexico  3094  4635  -1541  -33.25
Sri  Lanka  13246  20067  -6821  -33.99
South  Africa  14762  22410  -7648  -34.13
USA  2394095  3673428  -1279333  -34.83
Kazakhstan  7920  13464  -5544  -41.1  8
Senegal  2703  4739  -2036  -42.96
Russia  1254  2449  -1195  -48.80
Zimbabwe  1060  2598  -1538  -59.20
Vietnam  12544  35028  -22484  -64.19
Paraguay  12177  37269  -25092  -67.33
Argentina  1253267  3840299  -2587032  -67.37
Uruguay  15287  46849  -31562  -67.37
Australia  41214  138015  -96801  -70.14
Canada  97333  362278  -264945  -73.13
Thailand  63760  623751  -559991  -89.78
Pakistan  9573  94809  -85236  -89.90
Total  5906424  10962047  -5055623  -46.12
29Table 6: Scenario 3
Exporter  Break -Even point  Status Quo  Change  from  % difference
Status Quo  with status quo
(US $1,000)  (US$1,000)  (US $1,000)
France  2124519  1261822  862697  68.37
Netherlands  250961  165978  84983  51.20
Hungary  66231  46737  19494  41.71
Denmark  29763  21342  8421  39.46
Italy  566311  439438  126873  28.87
Spain  164350  128920  35430  27.48
Austria  38430  30843  7587  24.60
Germany  434150  363257  70893  19.52
Israel  8551  7176  1375  19.16
Nigeria  1977  1724  253  14.68
Romania  8828  8216  612  7.45
Brazil  28169  26228  1941  7.40
Egypt  2833  2645  188  7.11
Tanzania  6234  5871  363  6.18
India  193889  188000  5889  3.13
Paraguay  37742  37366  376  1.01
Uruguay  47169  47068  101  0.21
Argentina  3864668  3858778  5890  0.15
Kazakhstan  15162  15722  -560  -3.56
South Africa  22029  23250  -1221  -5.25
Russia  2726  2958  -232  -7.84
Senegal  6405  7258  -853  -11.75
USA  3419356  3901735  -482379  -12.36
Mexico  4259  4888  -629  -12.87
SriLanka  16509  20162  -3653  -18.12
Zimbabwe  2255  2805  -550  -19.61
Canada  281076  415762  -134686  -32.39
Australia  79534  142713  -63179  -44.27
Vietnam  19278  35420  -16142  -45.57
Thailand  226445  646472  -420027  -64.97
Pakistan  21361  96083  -74722  -77.77
Total  11991170  11956637  34533  0.29
30Table 7: Scenario 4
Exporter  Codex Standard  Status Quo  Change from  % difference
Status Quo  with status  quo
(US $1,000)  (US$1,000)  (US $1,000)
France  2458854  1261822  1197032  94.87
Denmark  40883  21342  19541  91.56
Netherlands  317510  165978  151532  91.30
Austria  58441  30843  27598  89.48
Paraguay  70092  37366  32726  87.58
Germany  678527  363257  315270  86.79
Uruguay  87431  47068  40363  85.75
Argentina  7161983  . 3858778  3303205  85.60
Italy  806800  439438  367362  83.60
Hungary  85001  46737  38264  81.87
Spain  226340  128920  97420  75.57
Romania  13284  8216  5068  61.68
Nigeria  2608  1724  884  51.28
Egypt  3942  2645  1297  49.04
Senegal  10795  7258  3537  48.73
Kazakhstan  22322  15722  6600  41.98
Russia  4185  2958  1227  41.48
Israel  10122  7176  2946  41.05
India  241664  188000  53664  28.54
Tanzania  7534  5871  1663  28.33
Brazil  33164  26228  6936  26.45
South Africa  28413  23250  5163  22.21
USA  4602486  3901735  700751  17.96
Canada  481298  415762  65536  15.76
Zimbabwe  3199  2805  394  14.05
Mexico  5560  4888  672  13.75
Sri Lanka  20275  20162  113  0.56
Australia  125813  142713  -16900  -11.84
Vietnam  27389  35420  -8031  -22.67
Thailand  420877  646472  -225595  -34.90
Pakistan  39472  96083  -56611  -58.92
Total  18096264  11956637  6139627  51.35
31Table 8: Scenario 5
Exporter  All importers 2ppb  Codex  Change  from  % difference with
Standard  Codex Standard  Codex Standard
(US $1,000)  (US$1,000)  (US $1,000)
Brazil  23535  33164  -9629  -29.03
Israel  6897  10122  -3225  -31.86
Tanzania  4971  7534  -2563  -34.02
Sri Lanka  13246  20275  -7029  -34.67
India  142176  241664  -99488  41.17
Mexico  3094  5560  -2466  -44.35
Hungary  46576  85001  -38425  -45.21
South Africa  14762  28413  -13651  -48.04
USA  2394095  4602486  -2208391  -47.98
Egypt  1841  3942  -2101  -53.30
Vietnam  12544  27389  -14845  -54.20
Nigeria  1114  2608  -1494  -57.29
Spain  97327  226340  -129013  -57.00
France  1012015  2458854  -1446839  -58.84
Netherlands  121376  317510  -196134  -61.77
Italy  282161  806800  -524639  -65.03
Kazakhstan  7920  22322  -14402  -64.52
Romania  4543  13284  -8741  -65.80
Australia  41214  125813  -84599  -67.24
Zimbabwe  1060  3199  -2139  -66.86
Denmark  12853  40883  -28030  -68.56
Russia  1254  4185  -2931  -70.04
Germany  190229  678527  -488298  -71.96
Austria  15522  58441  -42919  -73.44
Senegal  2703  10795  -8092  -74.96
Pakistan  9573  39472  -29899  -75.75
Canada  97333  481298  -383965  -79.78
Argentina  1253267  7161983  -5908716  -82.50
Paraguay  12177  70092  -57915  -82.63
Uruguay  15287  87431  -72144  -82.52
Thailand  63760  420877  -357117  -84.85
Total  5906425  18096264  -12189839  -67.36
32Table 9. Predicted Change in Imports at the Break-Even  Point
Importer  Change  Share in  Change (%) Partner  Change  Partner  Change
(US$  total  in country's  whose  trade  (US$  whose  (TJS$
1,000)  positive  export  flow will  1,000)  trade flow  1,000)
(negative)  increase  will
change in  most  decrease
percent  most
UK  +718725  +45  +91  France  462788
Germany  +642428  +40.2  +93  France  394212
Austria  +93678  +5.9  +100  USA  40773
Brazil  +74081  +4.6  +2  Argentina  71104  India  38
France  +33577  +2.1  +4  USA  9111
Australia  +18859  +1.2  +33  Thailand  8608  India  1851
Spain  +7943  +0.5  +1  France  3489  India  99
Italy  +6874  +0.4  +1  France  3403  India  125
Israel  +1554  +0.1  +1  USA  770  India  159
USA  -132257  -8.3  -52  Canada  91800
Nigeria  -170477  -10.7  -78  USA  98833
Japan  -190853  -11.9  -49  USA  80737
Malaysia  -283674  -17.8  -73  Thailand  125267
Canada  -325236  -20.4  -22  USA  307920
India  -495190  -31  -91  Thailand  231528
33Table 10. Predicted Change in Exports at the Break-even  Point
Exporter  Change  Share in  Change (%/)  Partner  Change  Partner  Change
(US$  total  in country's  whose  trade  (US$  whose  (US$ 1,000)
1,000)  positive  export  flow will  1,000)  trade flow
(negative)  increase  will
change in  most  decrease
percent  most
France  +861288  +71.6  +69  UK  463235  India  1562
Italy  +120195  +10.0  +28  Gernany  71352  India  1482
The Netherlands  +84559  +7.0  +52  Germany  57252  India  98
Germany  +56169  +4.7  +17  UK  49075  India  343
Spain  +27681  +2.3  +24  UK  13166  Nigeria  326
Hungary  +19984  +1.7  +42  Austria  17829  India  1155
India  +8828  +0.7  +4  UK  30390  Malaysia  16447
Denmark  +8332  +0.7  +40  Gernany  5492  India  61
Austria  +7490  +0.6  +25  Germany  5279  India  74
Argentina  +5542  +0.5  0  Brazil  82251  Nigeria  20996
Tanzania  +2118  +0.2  +10  UK  3010  India  419
Romania  +543  +0.05  +7  Austria  746  India  455
Paraguay  +367  +0.03  +1  Brazil  818  USA  137
Nigeria  +314  +0.03  +16  UK  458  India  97
Uruguay  +95  +0.01  0  Brazil  1005  Nigeria  255
Egypt  +51  +0.01  +4  UK  102  India  40
Israel  +34  +0.01  +8  Austria  42  India  17
Brazil  -189  -0.02  -I  Austria  1185  USA  735
Russia  -239  -0.02  -8  Germany  204  India  368
Zimbabwe  -478  -0.04  -14  UK  533  Nigeria  404
Senegal  -643  -0.05  -6  France  397  Nigeria  867
Mexico  -729  -0.06  -16  Germany  101  USA  259
Kazakhstan  -837  -0.07  -6  Germany  1023  India  1694
South Africa  -2188  -0.2  -17  UK  2045  Nigeria  1764
Sri Lanka  -5163  -0.4  -25  Austria  625  India  2706
Vietnam  -17471  -1.5  -49  Austria  468  Malaysia  10742
Australia  -64675  -5.4  -55  Germany  1309  Malaysia  28509
Pakistan  -75124  -6.2  -83  Germany  385  India  71428
Canada  -134549  -11.2  -33  UK  12308  USA  91532
Thailand  -419924  -34.9  -65  Australia  8614  India  231402
USA  -481349  -40  -17  UK  67538  Canada  291574
34Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2667  Trade  Reform  and  Household  Welfare:  Elena  lanchovichina  August  2001  L.  Tabada
The  Case  of Mexico  Alessandro  Nicita  36896
Isidro  Soloaga
WPS2668  Comparative  Life Expectancy  in Africa F. Desmond  McCarthy  August  2001  H. Sladovich
Holger  Wolf  37698
WPS2669  The  Impact  of NAFTA  and Options  for  Jorge Martinez-Vazquez  September  2001  S. Everhart
Tax Reform  in Mexico  Duanjie  Chen  30128
WPS2670  Stock Markets,  Banks,  and Growth:  Thorsten  Beck  September  2001  A. Yaptenco
Correlation  or Causality?  Ross  Levine  31823
WPS2671  Who Participates?  The  Supply  of  Norbert  R. Schady  September  2001  T. Gomez
Volunteer  Labor  and  the Distribution  32127
of Government  Programs  in Rural  Peru
WPS2672 Do Workfare  Participants  Recover  Martin  Ravallion  September  2001  C. Cunanan
Quickly  from Retrenchment?  Emanuela  Galasso  32301
Teodoro  Lazo
Ernesto  Philipp
WPS2673  Pollution  Havens  and Foreign  Direct  Beata K. Smarzynska  September  2001  L.  Tabada
Investment:  Dirty Secret  or Popular  Shang-Jin  Wei  36896
Myth?
WPS2674  Measuring  Economic  Downside  Yan  Wang  September  2001  A. Rivas
Risk  and Severity:  Growth  at Risk  Yudong  Yao  36270
WPS2675  Road Infrastructure  Concession  Franck  Bousquet  September  2001  G. Chenet-Smith
Practice  in Europe  Alain  Fayard  36370
WPS2676  An Alternative  Unifying  Measure  of  Philippe  Auffret  September  2001  K.  Tomlinson
Welfare  Gains  from Risk-Sharing  39763
WPS2677Can  Local  Institutions  Reduce  Poverty?  Paula  Donnelly-Roark  September  2001  E. Hornsby
Rural  Decentralization  in Burkina  Faso  Karim  Ouedraogo  33375
Xiao  Ye
WPS2678  Emerging  Markets  Instability:  Do  Graciela  Kaminsky  September  2001  E. Khine
Sovereign  Ratings  Affect Country  Sergio  Schmukler  37471
Risk  and Stock  Returns?
WPS2679  "Deposit  Insurance  Around  the Globe: Asl1  Demirgu,-Kunt  September  2001  K. Labrie
Where  Does  It Work?  Edward  J. Kane  31001
WPS2680  International  Cartel  Enforcement:  Simon  J. Evenett  September  2001  L.  Tabada
Lessons  from the 1990s  Margaret  C. Levenstein  36896
Valerie  Y. SuslowPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2681  On the Duration of Civil War  Paul Collier  September 2001  P. Collier
Anke Hoeffler  88208
Mans Soderbom
WPS2682  Deposit Insurance and Financial  Robert Cull  September 2001  K. Labrie
Development  Lemma W. Senbet  31001
Marco Sorge
WPS2683  Financial Policies and the Prevention  Frederic S. Mishkin  October 2001  R. Vo
of Financial Crises in Emerging  33722
Market Economies
WPS2684  From Monetary Targeting to Inflation  Frederic S. Mishkin  October 2001  R. Vo
Targeting: Lessons from Industrialized  33722
Countries
WPS2685  Monetary Policy Strategies for  Frederic S. Mishkin  October 2001  R. Vo
Latin America  Miguel A. Savastano  33722
WPS2686  Education, Earnings, and Inequality  Andreas Blom  October 2001  S. Benbouzid
in Brazil, 1982-98:  Implications for  Lauritz Holm-Nielsen  88469
Education Policy  Dorte Verner
WPS2687  Geographic Patterns of Land Use  Kenneth M. Chomitz  October 2001  S. Hendrckson
and Land Intensity in the Brazilian  Timothy S. Thomas  37118
Amazon
WPS2688  Aid, Shocks, and Growth  Paul Collier  October 2001  A. Kitson-Walters
Jan Dehn  33712